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Security enforcement in wireless sensor net-
works is by no means an easy task, due to the
inherent resource-constrained nature of sensor
nodes. To facilitate security enforcement, we pro-
pose to incorporate more powerful high-end Se-
curity Enforcement Facilitators (SEFs) into wire-
less sensor networks. In particular, the SEFs
are equipped with TCG-compliant Trusted Plat-
form Modules (TPMs) to protect cryptographic
secrets, perform authenticated booting and attest
their platform state to a remote base station. As
such, the SEFs act as online trusted third parties
to effectively monitor the states of sensor nodes,
help in key management, simplify secure routing,
and facilitate access control.
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are an
emerging technology with a wide range of appli-
cations, such as battlefield surveillance, health-
care monitoring, wildlife tracking, emergency re-
sponse, and disaster recovery. Sensor nodes in
WSNs are extremely constrained in hardware due
to requirements such as low cost and maximiz-
ing lifetime. As a result, sensor nodes normally
have very limited computation capability, storage
capacity, power supply, and radio transmission
range. For example, a typical Smart Dust [24]
sensor is configured with a 4MHz 8-bit CPU, 8Kb
program RAM and 0.5KB data memory.
When deployed in mission-critical applications,
securing WSNs is compulsory. Unfortunately, the
resource-constrained nature of sensor nodes makes
security enforcement in WSNs a challenging task.
Recently lots of efforts have been spent in ex-
ploring security enforcement in WSNs, and pro-
posals on various security services and mecha-
nisms have been proposed, ranging from intru-
sion detection [2, 16, 23, 30, 43], secure routing
[4, 17, 18, 25, 35], key management and establish-
ment [7, 9, 10, 12, 26, 27, 28, 29, 37, 44], access
control [41, 45], to data aggregation [8, 15, 31, 36].
Most of these efforts are on homogeneous WSNs
where all sensor nodes have the same capabili-
ties. However, homogeneous WSNs are not scal-
able. Indeed, both theoretical and empirical stud-
ies have found out that the larger number of sensor
nodes adversely affects the throughput of individ-
ual nodes to a substantial extent, and that as the
traffic becomes heavy, the control overhead due to
the underlying routing protocols alone will con-
sume a large portion of the available bandwidth
[11, 14].
To improve security enforcement and perfor-
mance, in this paper we propose a heterogeneous
WSN which comprises of the resource constraint
sensor nodes as well as more powerful high-end
Security Enforcement Facilitators (SEFs). Com-
pared to a sensor node, a SEF has higher compu-
tation capability, larger storage size, longer power
supply, and longer radio transmission range, and
it thus does not suffer from the resource scarce-
ness problem as much as a sensor node does.
More importantly, a SEF is equipped with trusted
computing technologies, and in particular a TCG-
compliant TPM (Trusted Platform Module) [39] is
attached to each SEF. According the TCG spec-
ifications, the TPM is a tamper-resistant, self-
contained secure coprocessor attached to a com-
puting platform, capable of performing crypto-
graphic functions. A TPM enabled trusted com-
puting platform provides sealed storage for stor-
ing secret data, measures and reports the integrity
state of the platform. As a result, the TPM func-
tions as a hardware based root of trust and has a
set of mechanisms to propagate trust across multi-
ple platforms. More discussions on TCG/TPM can
be found in Section 2. SEFs are special type of
TPM-enabled trusted computing platforms which
act as online trusted parties within a WSN; there-
fore security enforcement is expected to be enor-
mously simplified and improved. In this paper, we
focus on illustrating how SEFs help to facilitate
enforcing security mechanisms in WSNs, thereby
enhancing the efficacy of security enforcement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. In section 2, we give a brief overview of
the TPM as preliminary knowledge. We then dis-
cuss in detail the SEF-enabled WSN architecture
in Section 3. We illustrate how the introduction
of SEFs into WSNs can facilitate security enforce-
ment by examples on various security services in
Section 4. We review related work in Section 5,
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries: Overview of TPM
The latest effort in trusted computing is repre-
sented by the Trusted Computing Platform spec-
ifications defined by Trusted Computing Group
(TCG) [39]. The specifications aim to provide
hardware based root of trust through a tamper
resistant coprocessor, Trusted Platform Module
(TPM). The TPM is attached to a host machine,
and acts as the root of trust of the host platform
given its tamper resistance feature. The TPM
is designed to be capable of performing crypto-
graphic functions such as random number gener-
ation, SHA1 hash function, and RSA encryption
and digital signature.
A core functionality provided by the TPM is in-
tegrity measuring and storage, and reporting of the
host platform. The integrity measuring and stor-
age are achieved through a set of Platform Con-
figuration Registers (PCRs), internal to the TPM.
Each PCR value is a 20-byte cumulative hash di-
gest (SHA1 value) of a number of measured plat-
form integrity metrics. Altogether the PCRs record
the integrity status of the host platform from boot-
ing to OS loading to applications loading. A up-
date to a PCR value is through what is termed ex-
tending the PCR, which is described as
PCR[i] ← SHA1(PCR[i]||newlymeasuredvalue)
(1)
where i is the number of the PCR being updated.
Since a PRC value is a digest of the platform
state (which results from a series of state alter-
ing events), it is meaningless by itself. The data
that complements PCRs in providing semantics is
Stored Measurement Log (SML). The SML stores
the complete event history for all the PCRs, and
each PCR has corresponding entries in the SML
that records the series of events leading to the cur-
rent PCR value . The SML is stored unprotected
outside the TPM. This however does not com-
promise integrity as the corresponding digests are
stored in PCRs, and ”extending a PCR” can only
be performed by TPM protected capabilities. The
PCR values, together with the corresponding en-
tries of the SML, are used as evidence to attest to
the current platform state of the host.
Upon request, the TPM can report the state of
its underlying platform to a remote challenging en-
tity through attestation. In particular, the TPM
has a number of key pairs called Attestation Iden-
tity Keys (AIKs), which are used as aliases of
the unique Endorsement Key (EK). The attestation
protocol proceeds as follows. (1) The challeng-
ing entity issues a challenge message, indicating
that it wants to inspect one or more PCR values.
(2) A Platform Agent collects the related SML en-
tries corresponding to the requested PCR values.
(3) TPM sends the Platform Agent the requested
PCR values signed by the private key of an AIK.
(4) The Platform Agent sends the signed PCR val-
ues, together with the relevant SML entries and
the related credentials such as the certificates to
the challenging entity. (5) The challenging entity
verifies the replied data: the measurement digest
is computed from the SML entries and compared
with the signed PCR values; the credential of AIK
is validated.
Another security function provided by the TPM
is Sealed Storage, which encrypts sensitive data
with integrity measurement values. In particu-
lar, the sensitive data together with one or more
PCR values are encrypted/sealed. Subsequently,
the TPM releases an encrypted data only if the
current PCR values match those stored during en-
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Figure 1. Heterogeneous SEF-enabled Wireless Sensor Network
cryption. In other words, if the state of a platform
is modified, the encrypted data in the sealed stor-
age under that state will not be decrypted/unsealed.
The encryption key is protected either by the Stor-
age Root Key (SRK) internal to the TPM, or by a
key protected by the SRK.
3 Incorporating SEFs in Wireless
Sensor Networks
3.1 SEF-enabled Architecture
We partition a WSN into a number of clusters.
A SEF is placed into each cluster, acting as the
cluster head. In contrast to the sensor nodes, the
SEFs have relatively higher computation capabil-
ity, larger storage size, and longer radio transmis-
sion range. They also have longer power supply,
and in some circumstances, the SEFs can even be
line-powered, e.g., in the case that the wireless
sensor network is established to monitor a physical
facility, it will be easy to tap on the electricity lines
to supply power to the SEFs. Therefore unlike the
sensor nodes, the SEFs do not have the resource
scarceness problem. The introduction of the high-
end SEFs into a WSN actually makes the once ho-
mogeneous network heterogeneous, as shown in
Figure 1. Within a cluster, the SEF acts as a gate-
way, and a sensor node can reach the SEF directly,
or via few other sensor nodes. A fundamental cri-
teria for cluster partition is that the data traversal
path from the originating node to the SEF must
be short (i.e., the number of intermediary nodes is
small). Inter-cluster communication or communi-
cation between a sensor node and the base station
is through the respective cluster heads. Since SEFs
are not constrained by resources and power sup-
ply, communication at the level of SEFs and the
base station does not suffer from the limitations as
sensor nodes do, and it can utilize more advanced
communication infrastructure, e.g. 802.11 or even
wired network. As a result, SEFs-enabled archi-
tecture can be expected to enormously improves
the overall system performance and the lifetime of
the network.
More importantly, we equip each SEF with a
TPM, so as to facilitate and simplify security en-
forcement in the SEF-enabled WSNs. The ratio-
nale is that under the auspices of TPM, SEFs can
act as online trusted parties on behalf of the base
station1 in enforcing security mechanisms. The
base station ascertains the trustfulness of SEFs by
means of attestation (see Section 2). It is impor-
tant to note that sensor nodes do not challenge the
SEFs for attestation (in fact they can not afford
to do so), and they simply trust the SEFs. It is
the sole responsibility of the base station to check
1Without loss of generality, we assume that the base sta-
tion is the control center responsible for implementing security
mechanisms.
the status of the SEFs. The base station can ei-
ther periodically challenge all the SEFs on fixed
intervals, or choose some SEFs for attestation at
random. Misbehavior of the SEFs can be readily
detected by the base station in the course of attes-
tation. Without detecting compromises, the base
station can entrust the task of security enforcement
to individual SEFs.
Our SEF-enabled architecture has a number of
advantages: (1) As discussed earlier, the SEFs
help to reduce the amount of data that must tra-
verse the network, thereby enhancing the over sys-
tem throughput. (2) Partitioning a network into
clusters makes management of the network scal-
able. Incorporating SEFs simplifies management
of sensor nodes, as the base station can delegate
the management and adminstration of the sensor
nodes to the respective cluster heads. For exam-
ple, the SEF is aware of the structure of the clus-
ter where it resides, thus it takes charge of rout-
ing information within the cluster. The sensor
nodes no longer need to discover routing paths
by themselves, which is an energy-consuming pro-
cess; they simply depend on the SEF for data trans-
mission. (3) The SEF-enabled network allows for
easy node dynamics such as node join and node de-
parture. The reason is that node dynamics within
a cluster are managed by the corresponding clus-
ter head, which is closer to the sensor nodes. (4)
The SEFs amortize the workload of the base sta-
tion in security enforcement, preventing the base
station from becoming the system bottleneck. Fur-
ther, SEFs avoid single point of vulnerability at the
base station. (5) The SEFs can work together to
provide better resilient security mechanisms, using
for example threshold cryptographic techniques.
3.2 SEF Configuration
Depending on applications, hardware capabili-
ties of a SEF may vary from that comparable to a
bluetooth device to that of a high end PDA. The
TCG is currently working on the specifications for
Trusted Mobile Platforms, whose core element is
a Mobile Trusted Module (MTM), similar to the
TPM for PCs [40]. Attempts for prototype im-
plementation of MTM were also already available
(e.g., [38]). Hence, there exists no technical barrier
to implement TPM/MTM-enabled SEFs.
A trusted computing platform can be imple-
mented as a restricted system or an open system.
The former runs a small set of protected applica-
tions, while the latter runs both protected and un-
protected applications. We chose to design the
SEF as a restricted trusted computing platform
due to its specialized functionality and applica-
tion in WSNs. A reference platform configura-














Figure 2. A Reference SEF Platform
Configuration
runs the sole SEF application. At the applica-
tion layer, the SEF program includes four main
components. The trusted computing agent (or TC
agent) is the interface that accesses the functional-
ities provided by the underlying TPM/MTM such
as sealed storage and integrity reporting mecha-
nism. The security module is dedicated to im-
plementing the designated WSN security mecha-
nisms. The sensor agent is the communication
interface with sensor nodes, while the base sta-
tion agent is the interface with the base station or
other SEFs. The OS layer implements the SEF
core, bridging between the application layer and
the hardware layer. The hardware layer includes
a TCG-compliant TPM/MTM, providing hardware
based root of trust.
Finally, we stress that platform attestation in
our case allows the SEF to attest to the base sta-
tion the platform state from booting, to loading
of the SEF core, and to loading of the SEF pro-
gram. Referring to the general attestation protocol
reviewed in Section 2, the concrete attestation pro-
cess between the SEF platform and the base sta-
tion can be briefly outlined as follows: the base
station sends the challenging message to the base
station agent, who then invokes the TC agent to
obtain the requested PCR values signed by the
TPM/MTM. The base station agent collects the
pertinent SML entries and credentials, and returns
these data, along with the signed PCR values, to
the base station, who then carries out the necessary
verification process.
4 How SEFs Facilitate Security En-
forcement
In this section, we illustrate how SEFs help to
enforce security mechanisms efficiently in WSNs
through examples of intrusion detection, security
routing, key management and establishment, ac-




Wireless sensor networks are often deployed
in hostile environments. The unattended sensor
nodes thus easily fall victim to attacks whereby
an adversary physically invades the sensor nodes.
Since sensor nodes are simple in design and cannot
afford tamper resistance, an adversary who cap-
tures a sensor node can easily extract secrete in-
formation from them. As physical safety is fun-
damental to all security services, it is crucial to
timely detect compromises of sensor nodes.
An annoying fact is that the well-established
intrusion detection techniques for high end com-
puters or networks are in general not applica-
ble to WSNs. A WSN entails tailored intrusion
detection solutions. Since a sensor node by it-
self does not afford implementing intrusion detec-
tion mechanism, existing solutions for general Ad
Hoc wireless networks or sensor networks such as
[2, 16, 23, 30, 43] often enlist cooperation among
multiple nodes to detect intrusion, and in particu-
lar, each node is responsible for watching the ac-
tivities of its neighboring nodes. Cooperative in-
trusion detection of this kind is quite expensive
in both computation and power consumption in a
WSN, since sensor nodes are required to be on
alert all the time. Worse yet, collusion of sensor
nodes is even harder to detect, since each node
only has knowledge of its local situation.
In contrast, intrusion detection mechanism in
a SEF-enabled WSN can be readily performed at
two levels, the cluster level and the network level.
At the cluster level, each SEF monitors the sensor
nodes within the cluster. Since all sensor nodes
communicate with their designated SEF, intrusion
detection enforced by the SEF is bound to be effec-
tive. Detection of collusion among sensor nodes is
also possible, as the SEF monitors the behaviors
of all sensors in the cluster. Instead of invading a
sensor node, an adversary may try to deploy spu-
rious sensor nodes in a cluster in order to generate
bogus traffic. This kind of attacks can also be read-
ily addressed, with the SEF in place to detect the
presence of illegitimate nodes through key man-
agement and access control.
At the network wide level, SEFs and the base
station form the second layer of defense. SEFs can
watch each other’s behaviors to detect intrusion to
SEFs. The base station can also check the state
of SEFs by performing remote attestation period-
ically. Compromising a SEF via hardware attack
is much harder to succeed than hardware attack to
a sensor node, since the former is equipped with a
tamper-resistant TPM while the latter is not.
By and large, the introduction of SEFs into
a WSN helps to alleviate one of the fundamen-
tal threats to WSNs, i.e., compromises of sensor
nodes, thereby laying a solid foundation to imple-
ment other security mechanisms and services.
4.2 Secure Routing
Secure routing ensures secure data transmission
to the target node. In particular, the need for se-
cure routing stems from the fact that data trans-
mitted from one sensor node to another node (or to
the base station) requires many intermediary nodes
for routing. This leaves the chances for the rout-
ing nodes enroute to alter the data to be deliv-
ered. Existing proposals to secure routing, e.g.,
[4, 17, 18, 25, 35], rely on cooperation among
sensor nodes across the network. As the number
of sensor nodes increases in a WSN, the average
routing path becomes longer. This results in two
adversary effects. First, the control overhead due
to routing protocols would consume most of the
available bandwidth [11], and second, the through-
put of each node deteriorates rapidly as the number
of sensor nodes becomes large [14].
In a SEF-enabled WSN, however, data trans-
mission is carried out in a hierarchical manner.
Within a cluster, all traffic from sensor nodes are
sent to their SEF either directly or via a short
traversal path. SEFs then deliver traffic directly to
the base station. This greatly reduces routing pro-
tocol overhead and hence significantly improves
overall network throughput.
4.3 Key Management and Estab-
lishment
Public key cryptosystems are in general too ex-
pensive for WSNs, so symmetric key primitives
such as secret key encryption or cryptographic
hash function are often preferred in implementing
security mechanisms such as authentication and
data secrecy. As such, the issue of key manage-
ment and establishment in WSNs boils down to
sharing of secret keys between two sensor nodes
(or between the base station and sensor nodes). To
establish shared keys among sensor nodes, a com-
monly accepted approach is to pre-load a set of
key values inside sensor nodes before their deploy-
ment. These pre-loaded keys are later used either
directly as shared keys for data encryption and au-
thentication, e.g, [7, 10, 12, 26, 27, 28, 37, 44],
or as a basis to establish new keys, e.g., [9, 29].
Either way, the introduction of SEFs into a WSN
considerably simplifies key management.
Sensor nodes in a WSN either use a common
group key [9, 28, 29] or pair-wise keys [7, 10, 12,
26, 27, 37, 44] to achieve security. In the former
case, all sensor nodes in the WSN share a com-
mon key which is used to protect control mes-
sages. Sharing a common key on a large scale
is apparently risky, since compromise of a single
node would jeopardize the security of the entire
network. The SEF-enabled architecture assuages
this situation by partitioning a WSN into smaller
clusters. Each cluster shares a distinct group key,
instead of sharing a network wide group key. The
effect of compromise of a cluster key is there-
fore limited to the cluster only, with no adverse
effect on the other clusters. The SEFs can also
assist a common group key-based scheme with
two more advantages. First, in a WSN without
SEFs, the establishment and update of a common
key is normally dependent on the base station to
broadcast key management messages to all sensor
nodes. Performance of broadcast key management
schemes deteriorates rapidly as the group size in-
creases. This is especially true for WSNs where
the wireless channels subject to both random as
well as burst errors and key broadcast will suf-
fer from the so called ”ACK explosion” problem.
In a SEF-enabled WSN, key broadcast is confined
to individual clusters and hence effectively avoids
most of the pitfalls associated with key broadcast
in large scale networks. Second, SEFs enable de-
tection of compromised sensor nodes in a more
timely manner than in a WSN without SEFs.
Pair-wise key sharing is required to protect
communications between two communicating sen-
sor nodes. In a SEF-enabled network, the SEFs
serve as on-line trusted key distribution centers
for their respective clusters. Key establishment
via trusted key distribution center is a matured re-
search area where many highly efficient protocols
have been proposed in the literature.
Key management and establishment is a secu-
rity bootstrapping service, without which many
other security mechanisms are impossible. Intro-
ducing SEFs into a WSN make key management
and establishment much more simple and efficient
and hence more practical.
4.4 Access Control
Access control in a WSN is used to restrict out-
side entities from access sensor nodes. In a plain
WSN without SEFs, access control is enforced by
the base station which regulates access requests
from the outside entities. The base station first de-
termines the validity of the requesting entity, and if
it’s valid, passes the key used by the target node to
the requesting entity. SEFs add flexibility to access
control in a SEF-enabled WSN: each SEF controls
accesses to the nodes within the cluster it oversees.
Alternatively, the SEFs can collaborate to enforce
threshold based access control, which has greater
resilience.
We note that with the SEFs in place to enforce
access control, it is possible to readily address DoS
attacks, whereby one more adversaries intention-
ally send bogus messages or replay old messages
to a WSN in order to consume the power of the
sensor nodes and bandwidth of the network. First
of all, SEFs afford to implement relatively sophis-
ticated countermeasures to DoS attacks. On top
of that, with all outside communication passing
through SEFs, the DoS messages can be effec-
tively blocked from reaching the sensor nodes.
4.5 Secure Data Aggregation
It is well known that data transmission con-
sumes more power than data processing for a sen-
sor node. To reduce the amount of data traversed
across a network, data aggregation has been pro-
posed in certain applications wherein statistical
values of data from multiple sensor nodes rather
than individual sensor data are delivered. Secure
aggregation, e.g., [8, 15, 31, 36], ensures that data
are correctly aggregated en route to the destination
point (e.g., the base station). The basic approach
for secure data aggregation in WSNs is that some
sensor nodes are selected, acting as aggregators,
each of which is responsible for aggregating data
from its neighboring nodes; the aggregators then
forward the intermediate aggregated values to the
destination point where the final aggregated value
is calculated. Of course security measures must be
in place upon the aggregator nodes to ensure that
they act honestly. In a SEF-enabled WSN, SEFs
are natural candidates for aggregators, aggregat-
ing data from their respective clusters. Safe guard-
ing the correct operation of a SEF is much more
straightforward than safe guarding that of a sensor
node, by virtue of the TPM attached to the SEF.
5 Related Work
Clustering a wireless sensor network into sepa-
rate clusters were proposed by several authors for
achieving scalability and better performance (see
for example [1, 3, 6, 13, 21]). Normally, some
nodes within a cluster are chosen as cluster head.
SEFs in our proposal provide a natural way to
materialize the concept of cluster head. Network
clustering should be common practice in manag-
ing large WSNs.
Given the limited capabilities of sensor nodes,
several studies from both the research community
and the industry sector have tried to enhance net-
work performance by incorporating a number of
more powerful nodes in WSNs. A detailed the-
oretical analysis on the effect of adding power-
ful nodes to WSNs was given in [42]. It is con-
cluded that only a modest number of reliable, long-
range backhaul links and line-powered nodes are
required to have a significant effect, and if prop-
erly deployed, heterogeneity can triple the average
delivery rate and a 5-fold increase in the lifetime of
a large battery-powered sensor networks. Intel has
an on-going experimental effort [20] to incorpo-
rate Intel XScale based nodes into WSNs. The
experiment indicated that data traversing across a
network are routed biased towards the XScale
nodes over simple sensor nodes, thereby indeed
enhancing the overall system performance.
Our study of SEF-enabled WSNs is motivated
by the above idea of networking clustering and
TCG’s trusted computing platform. Our SEF-
enabled heterogeneous WSN differs from the In-
tel heterogeneous networks [20] in several as-
pects. The former is SEF-aware such that all
nodes within a cluster is aware of the existence
of the SEF, while the latter intends to achieve non
high-end node awareness. Sensor nodes in the In-
tel networks need to dynamically discover routing
pathes, while the sensor nodes in the SEF-enabled
networks are designed to get routing information
from the corresponding SEF. As a result, WSNs
empowered by SEFs are expected to have lower
control overhead and higher throughput than the
Intel heterogeneous networks. Moreover, our SEF-
enabled WSNs not only improves network perfor-
mance but also greatly facilitate security enforce-
ment, as we have demonstrated in the paper.
The introduction of the TPM-equipped SEFs
into wireless sensor networks represent yet an-
other application of trusted computing technology
in network applications. Trusted computing has
already been exploited in wireless networks where
wireless devices having moderate capabilities, in
which case the TCG-compliant TPMs can be di-
rectly embedded in the devices, e.g., [5, 33, 34]. In
contrast, the sensor nodes in a WSN we are consid-
ering by themselves cannot house TPMs. Trusted
computing has also been proposed to protect pri-
vacy in RFID systems (the RFID tags forming a
RFID system are also quite weak in capabilities),
where a TPM is attached to the RFID reader [32]
in order to make the reader act according to the
established privacy policies. Another work to pro-
tect RFID privacy is [22] which proposes to incor-
porate powerful devices into a RFID system, and
the devices are designed to simulate the behavior
of the RFID tags and the tags themselves are made
dormant. The devices are simply assumed to be
trusted, but how to make the assumption practi-
cally true is unclear. Anyway, a RFID system has
quite different working mechanisms from a gen-
eral WSN, thus the security concerns, and in turn
the challenges in enforcing security, in the two are
significantly different.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Sensor nodes are severely constrained by their
scarce resources in terms of computation capa-
bility, storage capacity, power supply, and radio
range. Security enforcement is thus extremely
challenging in wireless sensor networks. To solve
this problem, we proposed to render a wireless
sensor network heterogeneous, by incorporating
TPM-equipped SEFs into clusters of the network.
We gave various examples, to illustrate how SEFs
help to facilitate and simplify security enforcement
in WSNs.
This study is still in the preliminary stage.
Our future work will first focus on the design
and implementation of proof-of-the-concept TPM
equipped SEFs. We will then study and exper-
iment of incorporating SEFs to real world wire-
less sensor networks, e.g., the sensor networks de-
ployed to oversee an energy distribution system.
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